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ABSTRACT
We use data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters to compare point forecasts of GDP growth
and inflation with the subjective probability distributions held by forecasters. We find that SPF
forecasters summarize their underlying distributions in different ways and that their summaries tend
to be favorable relative to the central tendency of the underlying distributions. We also find that
those forecasters who report favorable point estimates in the current survey tend to do so in
subsequent surveys. These findings, plus the inescapable fact that point forecasts reveal nothing
about the uncertainty that forecasters feel, suggest that the SPF and similar surveys should not ask
for point forecasts. It seems more reasonable to elicit probabilistic expectations and derive measures
of central tendency and uncertainty, as we do here.
Joseph Engelberg


















Professional forecasters have long given point predictions of future events. Financial analysts o⁄er point
forecasts of the pro￿t that ￿rms will earn in the quarter ahead, macroeconomic forecasters give point pre-
dictions of annual GDP growth and in￿ ation, and ￿lm critics conjecture which actors will win Academy
Awards. A notable exception is that meteorologists commonly report the chance that it will rain during the
next day. However, meteorologists give point rather than probabilistic predictions of the next day￿ s high
and low temperatures.
Thoughtful forecasters rarely think that they have perfect foresight. Hence, their point predictions can at
most convey some notion of the central tendency of their beliefs, and nothing at all about the uncertainty they
feel. Suppose, as often seems reasonable, that forecasters actually have subjective probability distributions
for the events they predict. Then their point predictions should somehow be related to their subjective
distributions. But how? This is the question that we address. Our particular concern is with prediction
of real-valued outcomes such as ￿rm pro￿t, GDP growth, or temperature.1
In general, forecasters making point predictions of real outcomes are not asked to provide the mean,
median, mode or any other speci￿c feature of a subjective probability distribution. Instead, they are simply
asked to "predict" the outcome or to provide their "best prediction," without de￿nition of the word "best."
In the absence of explicit guidance, forecasters may report di⁄erent distributional features as their point
predictions. Hence, it is possible that forecasters who hold identical probabilistic beliefs provide di⁄erent
point predictions and that forecasters with dissimilar beliefs provide identical point predictions. If so,
comparison of point predictions across forecasters is problematic. Variation in predictions need not imply
disagreement among forecasters and homogeneity in predictions need not imply agreement.
To perform our analysis requires a data source in which forecasters provide both point predictions and
subjective distributions for speci￿c events. Perhaps uniquely among existing forecasting instruments, the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) provides such data (www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/). The SPF re-
spondents are macroeconomic forecasters who are queried about future GDP growth and in￿ ation in the
USA. The forecasters provide both point and probabilistic predictions for these quantities; the latter are
the probabilities that the outcome will lie in each of ten intervals. Another important feature of the SPF
is that the survey has a longitudinal component, with many forecasters providing multiple predictions over
the course of several years. Section 2 describes the SPF data in detail.
Although the SPF probabilistic prediction data do not completely identify the subjective distributions
that respondents hold, they do imply fairly tight bounds on the means, medians, and modes of these distrib-
1When the forecasting problem is to predict the occurrence of a binary event, the idea that point predictions should somehow
be related to subjective probability distributions was suggested forty years ago by Juster (1966). Considering the case in which
consumers are asked to give a point prediction of their buying intentions (buy or not buy), Juster wrote (page 664): ￿Consumers
reporting that they ￿ intend to buy A within X months￿can be thought of as saying that the probability of their purchasing A
within X months is high enough so that some form of ￿ yes￿answer is more accurate than a ￿ no￿answer.￿Thus, he hypothesized
that a consumer facing a yes/no intentions question responds as would a statistician asked to make a best point prediction of
a future random event. Subsequent analysis formalizing Juster￿ s idea appears in Manski (1990).
2utions. Hence, we are able to compare respondents￿point predictions with these features of their subjective
probability distributions. This is done in Section 3.
We ￿nd that reporting practices di⁄er substantially across forecasters. Whereas most SPF forecasters give
point predictions that are consistent with the means/medians/modes of their subjective distributions, many
do not. Moreover, the heterogeneity in reporting is not symmetric but rather tends towards presentation of
point forecasts that are favorable relative to the central tendencies of respondents￿subjective distributions.
In the case of GDP growth, respondents who give point predictions outside the bounds of their subjective
means/medians/modes are more likely to report point predictions that are above the upper bound than
below the lower bound. In the case of in￿ ation, the point predictions are more often below the lower bounds
than above the upper bounds. We also ￿nd persistence over time in the reporting practices of individual
respondents: forecasters who give point predictions above/below their subjective means/medians/modes in
one sample period are more likely to do the same the next period.
The ￿ndings described above are nonparametric ￿ we use the SPF interval probability data in their
raw form to bound subjective means/medians/modes rather than to ￿t the precise subjective probability
distributions that respondents hold. To enable further analysis of the data, we go on in Section 4 to
suppose that each subjective distribution placing positive probability on at least three intervals has the
generalized Beta form, and we use the interval probability data to ￿t the parameters. In those cases where
a forecast places positive probability on only one or two intervals, we suppose that the distribution has the
shape of an isosceles triangle and we ￿t its parameters. This done, we are able to compare SPF point
forecasts with the ￿tted probability distributions. The parametric analysis corroborates and sharpens our
nonparametric ￿nding of heterogeneity across forecasters, with a tendency for favorable point predictions.
The parametric analysis also corroborates our nonparametric ￿nding of persistence over time in individual
reporting practices.
Our ￿ndings suggest that e⁄orts to aggregate point predictions across forecasters face considerable di¢ -
culty. In the ￿nance literature, researchers have used the mean point prediction of a group of forecasters to
summarize the mean beliefs held by these forecasters and have interpreted cross-forecaster dispersion in point
predictions to indicate disagreement in their beliefs (e.g., Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002; Mankiw,
Reis, and Wolfers, 2003). These research practices confound variation in forecaster beliefs with variation in
the manner that forecasters make point predictions.
Our work also suggests that it may be problematic to interpret the observed time-series variation in SPF
"consensus" forecasts for the economy. So-called consensus forecasts are simply the median point predictions
of respondents. The SPF panel of forecasters evolves over time, with some new members entering each
quarter and some old ones exiting. Time-series variation in consensus forecasts need not re￿ ect real changes
in beliefs about the economy. It may instead re￿ ect changes in the reporting practices of the evolving panel.
Even if point forecasts were fully successful in describing the central tendencies of SPF forecaster beliefs,
they inherently would reveal nothing about the uncertainty that forecasters feel when predicting GDP growth
3or in￿ ation. Probabilistic forecasts are well-suited to this task.2 In Section 5, we use the subjective
probability distributions ￿tted in Section 4 to describe the uncertainty of SPF forecastsers. We also show
how the ￿tted distributions can be used to describe the extent to which di⁄erent forecasters disagree in their
predictions.
A separate matter, which we do not feel the need to address in the body of our paper, is the longstanding
use of cross-sectional dispersion in point predictions to measure forecaster uncertainty about future outcomes.
See, for example, Cukierman and Wachtel (1979), Levi and Makin (1979, 1980), Makin (1982), Brenner and
Landskroner (1983), Hahm and Steigerwald (1999), and Hayford (2000). This research practice is suspect
on logical grounds, even if all forecasters make their point predictions in the same way. Even in the
best of circumstances, point predictions provide no information about the uncertainty that forecasters feel.
This point was made forcefully almost twenty years ago by Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987). Nevertheless,
some researchers have continued since then to use the dispersion in point predictions to measure forecaster
uncertainty.
Even though Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) explicitly recognized the logical fallacy in using the dispersion
in point predictions to measure forecaster uncertainty, they nevertheless thought it useful to determine
the empirical relationship between such dispersion and uncertainty amongst the SPF respondents. More
recently, Giordani and Soderlind (2003a) have performed a similar empirical analysis. As far as we are
aware, the Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and Giordani and Soderlind (2003a) articles are the only research
before our own that has compared the SPF point and probabilistic predictions. However, their analyses
di⁄er fundamentally from ours. They sought to describe the empirical relationship between the cross-
sectional distribution of point predictions and the uncertainty evident in a typical forecaster￿ s subjective
probability distribution. In contrast, our concern is to understand the empirical relationship between
individual forecasters￿point predictions and their subjective probability distributions.
2 Data
Our data are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, administered since 1990 by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. The SPF was begun in 1968 by the American Statistical Association and the National
Bureau of Economic Research; hence, it was originally called the ASA-NBER survey. The panel of fore-
casters, who include university professors and private-sector macroeconomic researchers, are asked to predict
American GDP, in￿ ation, unemployment, interest rates, and other macroeconomic variables.3 The survey,
which is performed quarterly, is mailed to panel members the day after government release of quarterly data
on the national income and product accounts. The composition of the panel changes gradually over time,
with individual members providing forecasts for about six years on average.
2Manski (2004) reviews recent research eliciting probabilistic expectations in surveys and assesses the state of the art.
3A partial list of respondents is posted in the Philadelphia Fed￿ s quarterly release at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/
42.1 Question Format
Each quarter, the SPF asks panel members to make point and probabilistic forecasts of annual real GDP
and in￿ ation. To analyze the responses, it is important to understand the speci￿c format of the questions.
We explain the point and probabilistic questions in turn.
Point forecasts: The SPF instrument provides the value of GDP in the previous calendar year and asks
for a point forecast of GDP in the current and the next year. Thus, in the four quarterly surveys administered
during calendar year t, respondents are told the value of real GDP in year t - 1 and are asked to give point
forecasts of annual GDP in years t and t + 1. Similarly, the instrument provides the average value of the
GDP price index in the previous calendar year and asks for a point forecast of the average GDP index in
the current and the next year.
Probabilistic forecasts: In the four quarterly surveys administered during calendar year t, respondents
are asked to forecast the percentage change in annual real GDP between years t - 1 and t and, likewise, the
percentage change in GDP between years t and t + 1. They are similarly asked to forecast year-to-year
percentage changes in the average GDP price index. In each case, the SPF instrument partitions the real
number line into intervals and asks respondents to report their subjective probabilities that the variable of
interest will take a value in each interval. For GDP growth, the intervals are (￿1;￿2%);[x%;x + 1%) for
x = ￿2;￿1;:::;5, and [6%;1): For in￿ ation, they are (￿1;0%);[x%;x+1%) for x = 0;1;:::;7 and [8%;1):
Observe that panel members are asked to give point forecasts of the levels of GDP and the GDP price
index, but probabilistic forecasts of the year-to-year percentage changes in these quantities. To make the
point forecasts comparable to the probabilistic ones, we must convert the point forecasts of levels into point
forecasts of percentage change. This is straightforward to do between years t - 1 and t, because the SPF
instrument tells respondents the actual value of the year t - 1 level.4 Thus, to obtain a forecaster￿ s point
forecast of the percentage change in GDP between years t - 1 and t, we calculate the percentage change
between the SPF-speci￿ed level of year t - 1 GDP and the respondent￿ s point forecast of year t GDP. This
calculation is correct provided that panel members accept as accurate the SPF ￿gure for year t - 1 GDP5.
It is not straightforward to produce point forecasts of percentage change between years t and t + 1. In
this case, we only know forecasters￿point forecasts of the levels for the two years, and these point forecasts are
related in unknown ways to their subjective distributions. Hence, the percentage change in point forecasts
between years t and t + 1 need not equal the point forecast for percentage change that a panel member would
have stated had he been asked this question. Given this, our analysis restricts attention to comparisons of
4The year t-1 ￿gures provided to respondents are posted in the Philadelphia Fed￿ s ￿Real-Time Data Set￿ at
http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html
5During year t, information about year t-1 GDP and the GDP price index continues to be collected by the government.
Therefore, year t-1 values for GDP and the price index often are revised from quarter to quarter. The SPF updates the ￿gures
it gives forecasters accordingly. These revisions were generally small during our 1992-2004 sample period, the one notable
exception being a large revision in both accounts due to an accounting overhaul of the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) in quarter 4 of 1999. Otherwise, the average absolute value of the revision from quarter 1 to quarter 2 was 0.05% for
GDP and 0.03% for the price index, from quarter 2 to quarter 3 was 0.37% for GDP and 0.22% for the price index, and from
quarter 3 to quarter 4 was 0.12% for GDP and 0.02% for the price index. There were only four cases for GDP and no cases
for the price index where the change between quarters was larger than 1 percent.
5year t - 1 and year t.
2.2 Sample for Analysis
Although the SPF began in 1968, we restrict attention to data collected from 1992 on. There are several
reasons for this:
1. The survey only began asking forecasters for their annual (rather than quarterly) point forecasts in
the third quarter of 1983. This is important since the probabilistic forecasts are for annual changes.
2. After the third quarter of 1983, the survey intended to ask forecasters to report point forecasts for
current and next year￿ s GDP. However, the Philadelphia Fed has identi￿ed a few surveys between 1985
and 1990 in which it appears that forecasters were mistakenly asked about the previous and current
year GDP instead. The Fed took over the survey in Quarter 2 of 1990 and is sure that none of the
surveys since then have these errors.
3. The intervals in which respondents place probabilities have changed over the years. From Quarter 1 of
1983 through the end of 1991 there were 6 intervals, and after 1991 there were 10 intervals.
4. Prior to Quarter 3 of 1990, the SPF sometimes did not provide forecasters with ￿gures for the previous
year￿ s GDP and GDP price index.6 We need these ￿gures to convert point forecasts of levels into
point forecasts of percentage changes, as described above.
Because of these issues and inconsistencies, we restrict our analysis to the survey responses between
Quarter 1 of 1992 and Quarter 4 of 2004. We also exclude Quarter 1 of 1996 since the previous-year values
were unknwon at the time because of a delay in the release of the data caused by the federal government
shutdown. As Table 1 demonstrates, even after this restriction our sample is large, with 3173 observations
provided by 116 unique forecasters over the 13 year period.
6For example, the Quarter 1 survey of 1990 (which can be viewed at http://www.phil.frb.org/￿les/spf/form90.pdf) does not
have previous year data
6Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Quarter Observations Missing Observations Unique Forecasters Mean Forecasters per Survey
GDP growth 1 365 46 91 30.4
GDP growth 2 430 49 105 33.1
GDP growth 3 414 47 103 31.8
GDP growth 4 414 54 97 31.8
In￿ation 1 347 64 88 28.9
In￿ation 2 412 67 100 31.7
In￿ation 3 395 66 99 30.4
In￿ation 4 396 72 94 30.5
ALL - 3173 465 116 31.1
We count an observation as missing if (1) the forecaster does not provide a current year level point estimate or (2) the forecaster
does not provide values for his subjective distribution.
3 Nonparametric Analysis
It is reasonable to conjecture that, when asked for point forecasts of quantities that are uncertain, forecasters
respond with some measure of the central tendency of their subjective distributions. In probability theory,
the three most prominent measures of central tendency are the mean, median, and mode of a distribution.
The SPF data enable us to study the relationship between forecasters￿point forecasts and these measures.
Our analysis is in two parts. In this section, we perform a nonparametric analysis that does not assume
subjective distributions to have any speci￿c shape. In Section 4 we suppose that each subjective distribution
has a Beta or isosceles-triangle shape, and we re-analyze the data from that perspective.
3.1 Bounding Means, Medians, and Modes
Recall that the SPF probabilistic questions ask forecasters to report their subjective probabilities that GDP
growth and in￿ ation will lie in given intervals on the real line. The responses to these questions do not fully
reveal the subjective distributions that respondents hold, but they do bound these distributions. The data
directly imply bounds on subjective means and medians. These bounds are most easily explained by way
of examples. We assume throughout that the forecasters￿subjective distributions are continuous.
Consider the SPF questions concerning in￿ ation. Respondents are asked for ten subjective probabilities:
the probability that prices will decline, the probabilities that the percentage in￿ ation rate, denoted i, will
lie in the interval [x, x+1) for x = 0, 1, . . . , 7 percent; and the probability that the in￿ ation rate will
be 8 percent or higher. Suppose that a forecaster gives these positive responses: P(0 ￿ i < 1) = 0:2,
P(1 ￿ i < 2) = 0:2, P(2 ￿ i < 3) = 0:3, P(3 ￿ i < 4) = 0:2, P(4 ￿ i < 5) = 0:1, with all other responses
being zero. Then we can immediately conclude that this forecaster￿ s subjective median for in￿ ation lies in
the interval [0.02, 0.03). Lower and upper bounds on his subjective mean are obtained by placing all of each
7interval￿ s probability mass at the interval￿ s lower and upper endpoint, respectively. The resulting bound is
[0.018, 0.028).
These bounds on the median and mean are ￿nite intervals of width 0.01, but there are other examples
in which the bounds are in￿nite. Consider a forecaster with strong bimodal expectations who states that
P(i < 0) = 0:4 and P(8 ￿ i) = 0:6: In this case, we can only conclude that the subjective median is larger
than 0.08 and we cannot conclude anything at all about the subjective mean. Fortunately for our analysis,
cases with bounds of in￿nite width occur only occasionally. Of the 3173 probabilistic forecasts that we
observe, none yield a bound of in￿nite width on the forecaster￿ s subjective median, and 363 yield a bound
of in￿nite width on the subjective mean. In all other cases, the bound on the median and mean has width
0.01.
Using the SPF data to bound the mode of a subjective distribution is more subtle because the mode is a
local property that cannot be inferred from interval data without imposing some assumption. Our analysis
assumes that the mode is contained in the interval with the greatest probability mass. Thus, we conclude
in the ￿rst example above that the mode lies in the interval [0.02, 0.03) and in the second that it lies in the
interval [0:08, 1): In some cases, multiple intervals have the same greatest probability mass; for example
this would have occurred in the ￿rst example if the forecaster had placed probability 0.3 on both of the
intervals [0.02, 0.03) and [0.03, 0.04). Of the 3173 forecasts, none yield a bound of in￿nite width on the
forecaster￿ s subjective mode and 243 yield a ￿nite bound of width greater than 0.01. In all other cases, the
bound on the mode has width 0.01.
Although the bounds cannot pinpoint the mean/median/mode of each subjective distribution, they typ-
ically have width 0.01 and, hence, are very informative. Examination of the bounds shows that in most
forecasts, the three measures of central tendency are fairly close to one another. Calculations not reported
here show that in three quarters of the cases, the distance separating the three measures must be no larger
than 0.015.
3.2 Consistency of Point Forecasts with the Bounds
Having computed the above bounds, now consider a forecaster￿ s point forecast of some quantity. If the
point forecast lies within the bound for the median, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that the point
forecast is the median. If the point forecast does not lie within the bound for the median, we can reject
this hypothesis. The same reasoning applies to the mean and mode. Thus, we can determine the frequency
with which point forecasts are and are not consistent with the three measures of central tendency.
Table 2 gives the ￿ndings, aggregated across the years 1992-2004 but disaggregated by quarter. Each
entry in the table gives the percentage of cases in which a panel member￿ s point forecast of a given quantity
in a given quarter lies within his bound for a given measure of central tendency. For example, the upper
left entry for GDP growth, which is 83.01%, means that 83.01% of all ￿rst-quarter GDP point forecasts lay
within the bound obtained for the forecaster￿ s subjective mean. We call this an "Upper Bound on Mean
8Providers" because consistency of a point forecast with a bound does not imply that the forecaster must
have given his subjective mean as his point forecast. It only implies that he may have given the subjective
mean.
Table 2: Upper Bounds on mean/median/mode Providers
GDP Growth
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Mean 83.01% 82.09% 88.89% 93.72%
Median 75.34% 77.44% 87.68% 89.86%
Mode 85.21% 86.74% 89.86% 92.03%
In￿ation
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Mean 82.42% 84.22% 84.30% 88.89%
Median 79.25% 82.29% 84.81% 87.63%
Mode 84.44% 85.68% 87.09% 89.90%
The table shows that most point forecasts are consistent with the hypotheses that SPF panel members
report their subjective means, medians, or modes. However, there are many panel members whose point
forecasts are inconsistent with these hypotheses. This is especially evident in Quarter 1, where (17%, 25%,
15%) percent of the respondents give point forecasts that cannot be their subjective mean/median/mode.
Observe that, in each row of the table, the entries in the table increase markedly from Quarter 1 to
Quarter 4. This is reasonable to expect, because the forecast horizon shrinks as the year goes on ￿while
most of the current year lies ahead in the Quarter 1 surveys, most of it lies behind when the Quarter 4
surveys are conducted. Thus, the SPF forecasters should tend to have sharper subjective distributions in
Quarter 4 than in Quarter 1, implying that alternative measures of central tendency should draw nearer to
one another.
Table 3 shows that subjective distributions do tend to sharpen as the year goes on. For each quarter
and quantity of interest, the table shows the percentage of forecasters whose positive probability assessments
are concentrated in N or less intervals, where N ranges from 1 to 10. Observe how the entries increase with
Quarter. Consider, for example, the column for N = 2 when the quantity is GDP growth. In Quarter 1,
only 6.9% of the forecasters have subjective distributions that are concentrated in two or less intervals. In
Quarter 4, beliefs have sharpened so much that 58.9% of the subjective distributions are this concentrated.
9Table 3: Percent of Forecasters Using N Intervals or Less
GDP Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarter 1 0.0% 6.9% 32.3% 54.0% 71.8% 81.9% 90.4% 92.9% 95.1% 100.0%
Quarter 2 0.5% 15.1% 43.5% 62.1% 78.1% 85.1% 90.0% 93.5% 95.4% 100.0%
Quarter 3 1.9% 22.9% 62.3% 77.0% 86.2% 90.3% 94.2% 96.1% 96.8% 100.0%
Quarter 4 11.1% 58.9% 82.6% 91.1% 94.7% 96.1% 97.3% 97.8% 98.5% 100.0%
In￿ation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarter 1 0.6% 15.0% 51.0% 74.1% 86.5% 91.9% 97.1% 97.4% 98.0% 100.0%
Quarter 2 1.7% 21.9% 55.4% 74.8% 85.7% 92.2% 94.9% 96.6% 98.3% 100.0%
Quarter 3 4.1% 33.4% 70.1% 84.1% 92.7% 94.9% 97.7% 98.0% 98.7% 100.0%
Quarter 4 14.7% 59.6% 84.6% 94.7% 97.0% 97.7% 98.7% 99.0% 99.0% 100.0%
3.3 Inconsistencies Tend To Present Favorable Scenarios
Now consider the SPF panel members whose point forecasts are not consistent with their subjective means,
medians, or modes. Table 4 report the percentage of such cases in which the point forecast lies below or
above the bound. A clear ￿nding emerges. Most such point forecasts give a view of the economy that is
favorable relative to the central tendencies of respondents￿subjective distributions. Thus, forecasters who
skew their point forecasts tend to present rosy scenarios.
The table shows that, when forecasting GDP, the point forecasts that are inconsistent with measures
of central tendency are much more often above the upper bounds than below the lower bounds on means,
medians, and modes. Symmetrically, when forecasting in￿ ation, the point forecasts are much more often
below the lower bounds than above the upper ones. We do not know why forecasters skew their point
forecasts in this way. One might conjecture that the answer lies in strategic consideration or herd phenomena.
However, panel members ostensibly are unaware of each others forecasts when they respond to the survey
and individual forecasts are not later identi￿ed in the public release of the SPF.
Table 4: Evidence of Favorable Point forecasts
GDP Growth
N Above Bound Below Bound
Mean 211 73.46% 26.54%
Median 280 73.93% 26.07%
Mode 186 58.60% 41.40%
In￿ation
N Above Bound Below Bound
Mean 232 6.47% 93.53%
Median 254 22.44% 77.56%
Mode 204 12.25% 87.75%
103.4 Persistence of Favorable (Unfavorable) Inconsistencies
The SPF attaches an ID number to each forecaster, so we are able to analyze the behavior of individual
forecasters across time. We ￿nd that forecasters show some persistence in providing favorable (unfavorable)
point forecasts relative to their beliefs: a forecaster whose point forecast for in￿ ation (GDP growth) lies
above the upper bound for his mean/median/mode one period is more likely to provide a point forecast
above the upper bound for his mean/median/mode in later periods than is a forecaster whose point forecast
is within or below the bounds for his mean/median/mode. This persistence is also found for forecasters
whose point forecasts lie below the lower bound for their means/medians/modes.
Table 5 presents evidence of short term persistence, comparing forecasts in adjacent quarters. The table
considers point forecasts in relation to the bounds for the mean; the results for the median and mode are
similar and are omitted for brevity. Table 6 presents evidence of longer term persistence. Here we compare
forecasts in Quarter t with those made one, two, and three years later; that is, in Quarters t+4k, k = 1;2;3:
Table 5: Short Term Persistence (Mean)
GDP Growth
Quarter t+1
Quarter t N Above Bound Inside Bound Below Bound
Above Bound 113 24.8% 73.5% 1.8%
Inside Bound 1036 8.5% 89.2% 2.3%
Below Bound 48 6.3% 75.0% 18.8%
In￿ation
Quarter t+1
Quarter t N Above Bound Inside Bound Below Bound
Above Bound 10 10.0% 80.0% 10.0%
Inside Bound 966 1.1% 89.2% 9.6%
Below Bound 150 0.0% 67.3% 32.7%
Table 6: Long Term Persistence (Mean)
GDP Growth
Quarter t + 4 Quarter t + 8 Quarter t + 12
Quarter t N Above Inside Below N Above Inside Below N Above Inside Below
Above Bound 92 20.7% 77.2% 2.2% 73 21.9% 78.1% 0.0% 62 25.8% 74.2% 0.0%
Inside Bound 907 8.2% 89.6% 2.2% 707 8.5% 89.3% 2.3% 560 7.3% 90.2% 2.5%
Below Bound 35 14.3% 80.0% 5.7% 25 16.0% 80.0% 4.0% 17 11.8% 88.2% 0.0%
In￿ation
Quarter t + 4 Quarter t + 8 Quarter t + 12
Quarter t N Above Inside Below N Above Inside Below N Above Inside Below
Above Bound 5 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 7 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
Inside Bound 832 0.8% 88.0% 11.2% 664 0.5% 90.1% 9.5% 539 0.7% 90.4% 8.9%
Below Bound 125 0.8% 80.8% 18.4% 84 1.2% 84.5% 14.3% 59 0.0% 83.1% 16.9%
114 Parametric Analysis
The analysis of Section 3 has the great advantage of using the SPF data alone, without any assumptions
about the shapes of forecasters￿subjective distributions for GDP growth and in￿ ation. The accompanying
disadvantage is that we can draw only limited conclusions about the relationship of point forecasts to prob-
abilistic beliefs. Imposing assumptions enables sharper empirical analysis, albeit subject to the credibility
of the assumptions imposed.
In this section, we report a parametric analysis whose most basic assumption is that probabilistic beliefs
are unimodal. When an SPF probabilistic forecast assigns positive probability to three or more intervals, we
furthermore assume that the subjective distribution is a member of the generalized Beta family and use the
data to ￿t the Beta parameters. The generalized Beta distribution, which uses two parameters to describe
the shape of beliefs and two more to give their support, is a ￿ exible form that permits a distribution to have
di⁄erent values for its mean, median, and mode.
It is possible to ￿t a unique Beta distribution to the SPF data only when a forecast assigns positive
probability to at least three intervals. This occurs in 2234 of the 3173 forecasts that we observe. The
remaining 939 forecasts only assign positive probability to one bounded interval or to two adjacent intervals.
In these cases, we assume instead that the subjective distribution has the shape of an isosceles triangle
whose base includes all of the interval with greater probability mass and part of the other interval, if there
is one.7 This assumption gives one parameter to be ￿t, which ￿xes the center and height of the triangle.
An isosceles triangle is symmetric, so the mean, median, and mode of the ￿tted subjective distribution
necessarily coincide in these cases. This feature of the ￿t is not much of a practical concern because the
actual means, medians, and modes of forecasts that lie entirely within one or two intervals must lie relatively
close to one another in any event.
Section 4.1 describes the ￿tting methods in more detail. Section 4.2 compares the point forecasts with
the ￿tted probability distributions.
4.1 Fitting Methods
Case 1 - The forecaster uses 1 bounded interval: We assume that the subjective distribution takes the
shape of an isosceles triangle whose support is the interval. For example, if a forecaster places all probability
in the interval [3%, 4%], we assume that the support of his distribution is [.03, .04]. Then the base of the
triangle has its center at .035 and has length .01. The height of the triangle is 200, yielding area equal to 1.
Case 2 - The forecaster uses 2 intervals: Every forecaster who uses exactly 2 intervals uses adjacent
intervals. If the forecaster places equal probability in these intervals, we assume the support is the union
of the intervals and we ￿t an isosceles triangle whose base has length .02 and whose height is 100. If a
forecaster places more probability in one interval than the other, we assume that the support of the subjective
7The SPF data contain no cases in which a probabilistic forecast assigns all positive probability to two non-adjacent intervals.
Nor does it contain cases in which the majority of the probability mass lies in an unbounded tail interval. Hence, we do not
need a ￿tting method for these situations.
12distribution contains the entirety of the more probable interval. This restricts one endpoint of the support.
With this restriction and our assumption that the subjective distribution is an isosceles triangle, we are
able to completely specify the distribution: Suppose that a forecaster places probability ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ in the
intervals [y%;(y + 1)% ] and [(y + 1)%;(y + 2)%] respectively, where ￿ < 1









straightforward to show that the isosceles triangle with height 200
t+1 and endpoints (y +1￿t)% and (y +2)%
de￿nes a subjective probability density function that is consistent with the respondent￿ s beliefs.8 Figure 1
illustrates our construction.
Figure 1: Illustration of 2 Interval Case
1 - α α
y% (y+1)% (y+2)%
(y+1- t)%
Case 3 - The forecaster uses 3 or more intervals: In general, the probabilities that a forecaster
reports for the ten intervals in an SPF forecast reveal points on the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of his beliefs. For example, if a forecaster reports a 0.3 chance that GDP growth will be in the interval [2%,
3%), a 0.6 chance for the interval [3%, 4%) and a 0.1 chance for the interval [4%, 5%), we can infer these
points on the forecaster￿ s CDF: F(.02) = 0, F(.03) = 0.3, F(.04) = 0.9, and F(.05) = 1. When the forecast
places positive probability on three or more intervals, we ￿t a unimodal generalized Beta distribution to the













(r￿l)a+b￿1 dx if l < t ￿ r






￿(a+b) and ￿(a) =
R 1
0 xa￿1e￿xdx. We choose a generalized Beta distribution because the
two shape parameters a and b give considerable ￿ exibility and the two location parameters l and r allow us
to specify the support of the distribution. (The standard Beta distribution assumes that the support is the
interval [0,1]). To enforce unimodality, we maintain the restriction that a > 1 and b > 1.
Consider a forecaster whose observed points on his CDF are F(t1);:::F(t10), where t1;:::t10 are the right
endpoints of the ten intervals. If the forecaster does not place positive probabilities on the two tail intervals,
8To see this, note that h = 2





￿=2 solve the equations 1
2(t + 1)h = 1 and 1
2t[h t
(t+1)=2] = ￿. The left hand
side of the ￿rst equation gives the area of the entire isosceles triangle. The left hand side of the second equation gives the area
of the left sub-triangle in the interval with smaller probability mass.
13we take the support of the distribution to be the left and right endpoints of the intervals with positive
probability. This ￿xes l and r. For example, if a forecaster only places mass in the [2%, 3%), [3%, 4%0,







When a forecaster places mass in the lower tail interval, which is unbounded from below, we let l be
a free parameter in the minimization. Likewise, if a forecaster places mass in the upper tail, we let r be
a free parameter in the minimization. However, we restrict the support parameters l and r to lie within
the most extreme values that have actually occurred in the United States since 1930. Thus, for change in
GDP, we restrict l and r to the range ￿:13 < l < r < :19. For in￿ ation, we restrict l and r to the range
￿:12 < l < r < :12. For example, if a forecaster reports a 0.3 chance that GDP growth will be in the








4.2 Comparing the Point Forecasts with the Fitted Probability Distributions
Having ￿tted a CDF to each SPF probabilistic forecast, we can compare the point forecasts with the ￿tted
CDFs. This is accomplished in Figures 2 and 3, the former for GDP growth and the latter for in￿ ation. In
each ￿gure, the x-axis gives a percentile of the ￿tted probability distribution, ranging from 0 to 100. The
left-hand y-axis gives the number of cases in which a point forecast equals that percentile and the right-hand
y-axis gives the height of a kernel density forecast ￿tted to the empirical distribution of cases.9 For example,
Figure 2 shows that, of the 1623 point forecasts of GDP growth, 9 were at the 25th percentile of the ￿tted
probability distribution, 51 were at the 50th percentile, and 14 were at the 75th percentile.
Figure 2 shows that forecasters tend to report point forecasts for GDP growth that are high percentiles of
the ￿tted probability distributions. In contrast, Figure 3 shows that most forecasters report point forecasts
for in￿ ation that are low percentiles. Overall, 41.16% of point estimates were equal to or below their ￿tted
medians for the GDP growth questions while 71.16% of point estimates were equal to or below their ￿tted
medians for the in￿ ation questions. These results corroborate our earlier nonparametric ￿nding, discussed
in Section 3.3, that forecasters tend to provide favorable point forecasts relative to their probabilistic beliefs.
9When a forecaster reports a point estimate o⁄ the lower (upper) bound of his support, we place this observation in the 0
(100) percentile bin. In all but a few cases, the point forecast was within the support of the ￿tted distribution. For the output
question, the point forecast lay outside the support in only 18 of 1623 forecasts. For the in￿ation question, this occurred in 27
of the 1550 forecasts.
The kernel density estimate uses Silverman￿ s rule of thumb to compute the bandwidth.
14Moreover, we ￿nd that the distance between the point forecast and measures of central tendency are
positively correlated with forecaster uncertainty. Letting DIST be the distance between a forecaster￿ s point
forecast and his ￿tted median and IQR be the interquartile range of the ￿tted distribution, the correlation
between DIST and IQR is .25 in the GDP growth case and .29 in the in￿ ation case. This correlation seems
reasonable if forecasters are giving favorable percentiles of their subjective distributions as point estimates;
for example, if a forecaster always gave the 90th percentile of his distribution as a point forecast the distance
between this point forecast and a measure of central tendency will shrink as the the distribution tightens.














































In Section 3.4, we showed nonparametrically that SPF forecasters exhibit some time-series persistence,
with those who give favorable point forecasts in one quarter tending to do the same in subsequent quar-
ters. Table 7 examines persistence parametrically, by calculating the serial correlation of the point-forecast
percentiles. We ￿nd considerable short-term persistence but less long-term persistence, especially in the
in￿ ation forecasts.
Table 7: Persistence of Point-Forecast Percentiles
GDP Growth
Quarter t + 1 Quarter t + 4 Quarter t + 8 Quarter t + 12
Quarter t N Correlation N Correlation N Correlation N Correlation
Point-Forecast Percentile 1197 0.2553 1034 0.0847 805 0.1196 639 0.1490
In￿ation
Quarter t + 1 Quarter t + 4 Quarter t + 8 Quarter t + 12
Quarter t N Correlation N Correlation N Correlation N Correlation
Point-Forecast Percentile 1126 0.2157 962 0.0496 755 0.0243 602 0.0144
5 Measuring Forecaster Uncertainty and Disagreement
The analysis of Sections 3 and 4 has shown that the point forecasts of SPF forecasters tend to be favorable
relative to their probabilistic beliefs. We have also shown evidence of time-series persistence in the way
that particular forecasters form their point forecasts. These ￿ndings suggest that elicitation of subjective
16distributions provides clearer insights into forecasters￿beliefs than does collection of point forecasts. The
argument for probabilistic measurement of expectations is further enhanced when one recognizes that point
forecasts provide no sense of the uncertainty that forecasters feel.
Indeed, present practices in reporting SPF data con￿ ate forecaster uncertainty and disagreement. In
the quarterly reports released by the Philadelphia Fed, the SPF data are aggregated across forecasters in
two ways: (1) for the questions that elicit point forecasts, the median point forecast is reported and (2)
for the questions that elicit distributions by having forecasters place probability mass in 10 intervals, the
mean probability mass in each interval is reported. The median point forecast reveals no information about
forecaster uncertainty. Reporting the mean probability mass in each interval mixes together forecaster
uncertainty and disagreement. This fact has previously been recognized by Giordani and Soderlind (2003).
To illustrate, suppose that there are two forecasters, labeled A and B, and consider two scenarios. In one
scenario, Forecaster A places all probability mass in the GDP growth interval [2%,3%) while Forecaster B
places all probability mass in the GDP growth interval [3%, 4%). In the other scenario, both forecasters place
half their probability mass in the interval [2%,3%) and half in the interval [3%,4%). In the ￿rst scenario, the
forecasters are individually quite certain about the outcome but they completely disagree with one another.
In the second scenario, the forecasters are individually uncertain about the outcome but they completely
agree. Reporting the mean probability mass in each interval makes these two scenarios indistinguishable.
We think it important to separately report forecaster uncertainty and disagreement. In this section
we show how to do so. Section 5.1 uses the probability distributions ￿tted in Section 4 to describe the
uncertainty that SPF forecasters feel. Section 5.2 uses the ￿tted distributions to describe disagreements in
the central tendency of forecasts. Finally, Section 5.3 jointly portrays the uncertainty and central tendency
of SPF forecasts.
5.1 Measuring Uncertainty
The interquartile range (IQR) of a forecaster￿ s ￿tted subjective probability distribution provides an infor-
mative scalar measure of the uncertainty that this forecaster perceives. Forecasters vary in the uncertainty
they feel so, at any point in time, the IQR varies across the members of the SPF panel. A simple way to
summarize the cross-sectional distribution of forecaster uncertainty is to calculate the cross-sectional lower
quartile, median, and upper quartile of the IQR. This is done in Figures 4 and 5 for GDP growth and
in￿ ation respectively.
To illustrate, consider the entries in Figure 4 for the ￿rst quarter of 2004. The ￿gures shows the cross-
sectional lower quartile of IQR to be 0.011, the median to be 0.013 and the upper quartile to be 0.017: This
means that, in the ￿rst quarter of 2004, the ￿tted subjective probability distributions of (25, 50, 75) percent
of the then-active SPF forecasters had an IQR no larger than (0.011, 0.013, 0.017) respectively. The ￿rst
quarter of other years shows similar variation.
Observe that, within each year, the IQRs of SPF forecasters tend to fall sharply as the year progresses
17from quarter 1 to quarter 4. In the nonparametric analysis of Section 3.2, we reported (see Table 3) that
subjective distributions tend to sharpen as the year goes on. Using the ￿tted probability distributions,
Figures 4 and 5 show that this phenomenon occurs each and every year. The reason presumably is that the
forecast horizon shrinks as the year progresses.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2 Measuring Disagreement in Central Tendency
For the sake of speci￿city, let us use the median of a ￿tted subjective probability distribution to measure
the central tendency of an SPF forecast. Then the absolute di⁄erence in medians (ADM) of two forecasts
measures the degree to which these forecasts disagree in central tendency. If N SPF forecasters provide a





pairs of medians to be compared. A simple way to summarize
the extent to which forecasts disagree in central tendency is to calculate the cross-sectional lower quartile,
median, and upper quartile of the ADM. This is done in Figures 6 and 7 for GDP growth and in￿ ation
respectively.
18Observe that the majority of disagreements in central tendency are smaller than 0.01 and few exceed
0.012. Within each year, the ADMs of SPF forecasters tend to fall as the year progresses from quarter 1 to
quarter 4. Again, the reason presumably is that the forecast horizon shrinks as the year progresses.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3 Joint Portrayal of the Central Tendency and Uncertainty of SPF Forecasts
We have thus far discussed separately the central tendency and uncertainty of SPF probabilistic forecasts.
When aggregating the beliefs of forecasters, we recommend joint portrayal of these two basic features of the
￿tted subjective probability distributions. This can be done in a two-dimensional plot having the median
on the x-axis and the IQR on the y-axis. To illustrate, Figures 8 and 9 present such plots for forecasts of
in￿ ation in the third quarter of 1999 and the ￿rst quarter of 2002.
The plots are simple to interpret. Each point in a plot represents a unique forecaster. When the
points cluster towards the top, forecasters tend to feel much uncertainty. When the points are dispersed
horizontally, disagreement in the central tendency of forecasts is high. Comparing the 1999 Q3 and 2002
19Q1 plots, we see that the cross-sectional distribution of uncertainty is similar in these two periods, but
disagreement in central tendency is more pronounced in the latter period.

























If people think probabilistically, as economists generally assume, their point forecasts should somehow be
related to their underlying subjective distributions. We have shown that SPF forecasters summarize their
underlying distributions in di⁄erent ways and that their summaries tend to be favorable relative to the
central tendency of the underlying distributions.
This ￿nding has implications for research relying on point forecasts. For example, the accounting
literature has documented a positive relationship between the optimism of analysts￿earnings forecasts and
the forecast horizon.10 In particular, longer horizon earnings forecasts tend to be higher than the realized
earnings, but the bias disappears for shorter horizon forecasts; in fact, there is some evidence that short
horizon forecasts are slightly pessimistic. Some authors, for example Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki
(2004), have argued that the observed pattern of bias re￿ ects ￿rms￿e⁄orts to "guide" analysts￿forecasts
down to beatable levels as the horizon shortens. Our ￿ndings suggest another explanation. It could be that
analysts have rational expectations with respect to future earnings but that their point forecasts are simply
high percentiles of their underlying distributions. Recall from Section 4.2 that the distance between SPF
point forecasts and subjective medians are positively correlated with forecaster uncertainty. Presumably,
analysts become more certain of their forecasts as the earnings announcement date approaches. Hence, we
should expect to ￿nd the positive relationship between point forecast optimism and forecast horizon that is
documented in the accounting literature.
Our ￿ndings also have important implications outside academia. It is standard practice for experts to
express their beliefs and predictions using point forecasts.11 These point forecasts may have signi￿cant con-
sequences: the Congressional Budget O¢ ce￿ s (CBO) (www.cbo.gov) point forecasts for the costs of legislative
bills may a⁄ect legislators￿voting decisions, and ￿nancial analysts￿earnings forecasts and price targets may
a⁄ect people￿ s investment decisions. The SPF evidence suggests that point forecasts may have a systematic,
favorable bias. This, plus the inescapable fact that point forecasts reveal nothing about the uncertainty that
forecasters feel, suggest that the agencies who commission forecasts should not ask for point forecasts. In-
stead, they should elicit probabilistic expectations and derive measures of central tendency and uncertainty,
as we have done here.
10Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2005) provide a review of the literature.
11One notable exception is the Bank of England (www.bankofengland.co.uk), which o⁄ers "fan charts" for its projections of
future in￿ation and GDP. These fan charts display the 10th, 20th, ..., 90th percentile from the Bank￿ s probabilistic forecasts
for future in￿ation and GDP.
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